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Abstract
This article serves as an introduction to the articles that follow, which examine questions of
power and sensibility in four discrete ways. They look variously at the moral limits of international
law, the extent to which power has been delegated to or asserted by the U.N. Security Council,
the successes and failures of efforts at international criminal prosecution, and the challenge of
applying the traditional laws of war in the context of a “Global War on Terror.” This introduction
outlines the various contributions that follow and sketches out some potential implications.
INTRODUCTION
THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE LAW OF WAR: POWER AND
SENSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Simon Chesterman*
Hard cases make bad law, as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
famously warned a century ago.' For international law, regulat-
ing the use of force is an especially hard case and the body of
norms is comparatively new - a general prohibition on war is
younger than Holmes' clich6.2 A more recent corollary is that
an international order in which the most powerful country on
the planet is also the most frightened - or regards itself as the
most vulnerable to attack - will be an unstable one. This insta-
bility plays out in the following set of essays that consider
whether and how the United Nations and other instruments of
international order can and should prevent war, contain its ex-
cesses, and recover from its losses.
Law's capacity to restrain power and prevent the co-optation
of norms to serve the ends of the powerful has always presented
difficulties to those who study and practice it. Writing on the
development of the rule of law in eighteenth century England,
the historian E.P. Thompson endorsed the Marxist view that law
systematized and reified inequality between the classes. 3 Never-
theless, he argued, law also mediated those class relations
through legal forms, constraining the actions of the ruling class.'
For this reason, unusually for a Marxist, he termed the rule of
law an "unqualified human good."'
* Executive Director, Institute for International Law & Justice, New York Univer-
sity School of Law; D.Phil., 2000, University of Oxford; LL.B. (Hons.), 1997, University
of Melbourne; B.A. (Hons.), 1995, University of Melbourne.
1. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
2. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2 (4); see also Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War
as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (Kellogg-Briand
Pact); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963).
3. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 259
(1975).
4. See id. at 262-63.
5. See id. at 266.
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In contemporary debates about the relevance of the United
Nations, there is an unhelpful tendency to focus almost exclu-
sively on the relationship between the world organization and its
most powerful member.6 Within the United States, the United
Nations is commonly regarded as an obstacle to - or, at best, a
tool for - the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.' Few pol-
icy-makers seriously believe that the United Nations could play a
role in the formulation of that foreign policy. Outside the United
States, the United Nations is considered either a pawn of the
superpower or idealized as the only means by which that super-
power, Gulliver-like, might be restrained.' Such parodies both
understate and overstate the significance of international law
and international organizations. The power of international law,
such as it is, lies not in its capacity to drive history nor even to
provide the language in which it is written; rather, on a good
day, international law may provide a grammar for that language:
shared rules about what can and cannot be said, whose violation
may undermine the legitimacy of an action but may also be chal-
lenged on the basis of what does and does not make sense.
The articles that follow examine these questions of power
and sensibility in four discrete ways, looking variously at the
moral limits of international law, the extent to which power has
been delegated to or asserted by the U.N. Security Council, the
successes and failures of efforts at international criminal prose-
cution, and the challenge of applying the traditional laws of war
in the context of a "Global War on Terror." This introduction
outlines the various contributions that follow and sketches out
some potential implications.
The first group of articles comprises Jean Bethke Elshtain's
6. See, e.g., John J. Kavanagh, U.S. Powers and the United Nations Security Counci4 20
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 159 (1997);Joseph Mettimano, The United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child and the Political Climate in the United States, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING
POVERTY 209 (1998); James A.R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, Section IV. The Status in
United States Law of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Char-
ter, 46 Am.J. COMe. L. 421 (1998).
7. SeeJules Lobel, American Hegemony and International Law: Benign Hegemony? Ko-
sovo and Article 2(4) of the UN. Charter, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 19, 20-23 (2000); see also Anne-
Marie Slaughter, AE/ Conference Trends in Global Governance: Do They Threaten American
Sovereignty? Article and Response: Building Global Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 223
(2000).
8. See Jan Kavan, UN, USA, Iraq, AssemblVe Europ~ene des Citoyens (Oct. 24,
2003), at http://www.reseau-ipam.org/article.php3?idarticle=434; see also U.N. Chief,
Iraqi Minister to Meet, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 27, 1990, at IA.
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lecture on the just war tradition and natural law, together with
responses from Thomas Lee and John Davenport. Elshtain's
central argument is that a theologically-founded conception of
human nature - love for one's neighbor - makes possible, in-
deed it may demand, the pursuit of "projects of justice" through
the use of armed force.9 Lee's response is a warning against un-
critical embrace of unilateral assertions of how such projects are
to be determined; institutions such as the U.N. Security Council,
he argues, provide a useful check against the imprudent or abu-
sive pursuit of such subjective enterprises.1 ° Davenport seeks to
map out a "third way" around these concerns through positing a
federation of democratic Nations that would replace interna-
tional vigilantism with "a legitimate global police power."11
Though none mentions the word, a consideration of the
just war tradition in the context of the 2003 war led by the
United States against Iraq surely invites comparison with former
just wars fought under a banner unfortunately embraced by
President George W. Bush: crusades. It was peculiarly awkward
that in both Afghanistan and Iraq the European Crusaders of
the Middle Ages were known as "Franks" - coincidentally the
surname of General Tommy Franks, the Commander in Chief of
U.S. Central Command who oversaw the two battles. 12 The
troubling history of the just war goes beyond issues of packaging,
however. Though typically identified today with humanitarian
intervention, the origin of arguments that war may be waged on
behalf of an oppressed population have always overlapped with
arguments that war may be waged against the wicked. Such justi-
fications for taking up arms can be found in the writings and
practice of most religions and those empires styling themselves
as civilized.13 Wars and interventions over religious differences
9. SeeJean Bethke Elshtain, The Just War Tradition and Natural Law, 28 FoRDIIAM
INT'L LJ. 742 (2005).
10. See Thomas H. Lee, The Augustinian Just-War Tradition and the Problem of Pretext
in Humanitarian Intervention, 28 ForDAsM INT'L LJ. 756 (2005).
11. See John J. Davenport, Just War Theory Requires a New Federation of Democratic
Nations, 28 FoRrHAM INT'L L.J. 763 (2005).
12. U.S. military operations against Afghanistan were referred to initially as "Infi-
nite Justice" - a title that captured the rhetoric of President Bush and the national
sentiment in the weeks after September lth. This was swiftly changed, however, when
the Council on American-Islamic Relations and other Muslim groups complained that
only Allah could dispense such justice. See Jonathan Weisman, Mobilization Name
Changes, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2001.
13. On Christianity in particular, see ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEO-
20051
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were frequent in Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries; many writers accepted these wars as just, either in them-
selves or insofar as they were undertaken on the orders of God.1 4
Alberico Gentili was unusual among his contemporaries for ob-
serving that not merely Christians and Jews, but Ethiopians, Per-
sians, Spartans, and Turks had all been stirred to arms by divine
influence.' 5
The modern manifestation of the just war - "humanitarian
intervention" - reached a brief high surrounding the Kosovo
intervention in 1999, leading among other things to the comple-
tion of a path-breaking report entitled The Responsibility to Pro-
tect.'6 Completed before but published after September 11,
2001, this document both epitomized the heights of humanita-
rian rhetoric through the 1990s and demonstrated the shallow-
ness with which those values were held by governments. As the
war on terror and the axis of evil came to dominate the moral
rhetoric of international affairs, saving the oppressed was put on
LOGICA II, ii, Ques. 40 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947), availa-
ble at http://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/home.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2005);
see also AUGUSTINE, QUESTIONS ON THE HEPTATEUCH, ONJOSHUA, Ques. 10 (419); FRAN-
CISCO SUAREZ, ON THE THREE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES: FAITH, HOPE, AND CHAUTY Disp.
XIII, reprinted in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FANCISCO SUAREZ 805 (Gwladys L.
Williams et al. trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1944); HUGO GROT1us, DE IuRE BELLI AC
PAciS LIBRI TRES II(i) & (xx) (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford Press 1925) (1646);
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, AP-
PLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS II(iv) (Charles G. Fen-
wick trans., Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758). On Islam and the doctrine of jihad, see MAJID
KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 51-73 (1955).
14. See Coleman Phillipson, Introduction, in 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI 34a
(j. Rolfe trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1933) (1612) (listing Bartolus, Baldus, Joan-
nes da Lignano [Giovanni de Legnano], John Wycliffe, Domingo Soto, Covarruvias,
and Ayala); see also GIOVANNI DA LEGNANO, TRACTATUS DE BELLO, DE REPRESALIS ET DE
DUELLO 224-31 (James Leslie Brierly trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1917) (1447). BALTHA-
ZAR AYALA, DE JURE ET OFFCIIS BELLICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI LIBRI III, I, ii, § 28
(John Pawley Bate, Carnegie Inst. 1912) (1582), states that war may not be declared
against infidels merely because they are infidels, but that a just war may be waged on
heretics who abandon the Christian faith. He then goes on to state that another just
cause of war is where infidels "are found hindering by their blasphemies and false argu-
ments the Christian faith and also the free preaching of the Gospel rule." Id. I, ii, § 30
(citing ALPHONSUS DE CASTRO [Alfonso of Castile], DE JUSTA HaeRETICORUM PUNITIONE
[On the Lawful Punishment of Heretics] bk. 2 (1547)).
15. See GENTILI, supra note 14, at 36.
16. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), at http://www.iciss.gc.ca (last visited May 2, 2005).
See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR ORJUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 211-18 (2001).
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hold in favor of oppressing the wicked."7
The second mode of analysis of power and legitimacy in this
collection considers the role of the U.N. Security Council. Eric
Rosand discusses the emerging legislative role of the Council in
the context of the war on terror, focusing in particular on the
Council's adoption of resolutions of general rather than specific
application. He argues, in essence, that this is a necessary and
pragmatic response to such threats as terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction.18
One of the most important transformations in international
law through the twentieth century was the shift from predomi-
nantly bilateral treaty relations to multilateral institutional rela-
tions. 9 This has been an evolutionary process - a metaphor
chosen carefully as it indicates the essentially random nature of
many of the major changes and the tendency to judge them by
reference to their effectiveness or capacity to survive. This ends-
driven approach to international institutions may explain the
current fascination with the role of the Security Council. Draw-
ing an analogy with the centralization of authority in the mod-
ern State, comparisons may be drawn with Thomas Hobbes' ar-
gument that the necessary end of security in a state of nature
requires the transfer of the means to maintain that security to a
Leviathan. z °
But is that what has happened in the current system? If
there were some conscious effort to elevate the Security Council
to the status of an international Leviathan, it would be necessary
to provide it with the resources and the information necessary to
do its job effectively. This has not happened. Instead, the Coun-
cil operates with minimal Secretariat resources and depends al-
most entirely on the member States for information. 21 Lack of
17. Responsibility to Protect may yet have a deeper and more lasting impact, fol-
lowing its endorsement by a major U.N. reform initiative in 2004-05. See High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Respon-
sibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004), at http://www.un.org/secureworld.
18. See Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global Legislator" Ultra Vires or Ultra
Innovative?, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 542 (2005).
19. See James P. Muldoon, Jr., Introduction, in MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND THE
UNITED NATIONS TODAY 1-2 (James P. Muldoon et al. eds., 1999).
20. See THOMAS HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN ch. 17 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books
1985) (1651).
21. See Eric Rosand, Current Deveopment: Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-
Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 333, 341 (2003).
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independent capacity has not, of course, prevented the Council
from acting. It is clear that the delegates to the San Francisco
conference in 1945 did not intend to establish a world govern-
ment, but the Council's powers have nonetheless grown expo-
nentially through practice.22 Surprises for the delegates from
San Francisco would include the Council's role in delimiting
borders, establishing international criminal tribunals, governing
territory, and passing laws of general application on terrorism
and nuclear proliferation.23
In part this activism is tolerated due to the Charter mecha-
nism of each organ determining its own competence (rather
than having the International Court of Justice operate as a con-
stitutional court, for example) ;24 in part it is encouraged by the
Council's primary responsibility for international peace and se-
curity; and in part it is driven by the modest size of the Council
and its domination by a small group of countries - especially
during the periods of broad agreement among those countries
on the appropriate response to certain incidents in the early
1990s and immediately following the September 1 1th attacks in
2001.
The absence of formal review mechanisms may appear to be
a prohibitive barrier to establishing any check on the Council's
expansive interpretation of its powers. Limits do exist, however.
First, at the very least, the Council's own voting rules are a check
on the unfettered exercise of those powers. 25 Second, the Gen-
eral Assembly can challenge the Council's actions through a cen-
sure,26 question them through a request for an advisory opinion
22. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Recent Security Council Actions Concerning Internal Con-
flicts: Economic Sanctions, Am. Soc. INT'L L. NEWSLETrER (Jan. 1994); see also Miguel An-
gel Gonzalez Felix, Fifth Legal Advisers' Meeting at UN Headquarters in New York, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 644, 649 (1995).
23. See, e.g., Press Release, Council Decides to Establish Third Trial Chamber of
International Criminal Tribunal For Former Yugosloavia, U.N. Doc. SC/6514 (1998);
Blake Klein, "Bad Cop" Diplomacy & Preemption: An Analysis of International Law and Polit-
ics Governing Weapons Proliferation, 14 DuEJ. COMI. & INT'L L. 389 (2004)
24. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 66 (1963); see also YEHUDA BLUM, GRADING
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 251 (1993).
25. At least 9 of 15 Security Council members must vote in favour of a resolution in
order for it to be binding on all Member States, and will fail if one permanent Security
Council Member vetoes the measure. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
26. Cf G.A. Res. 377A(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950) (the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, where the General Assembly asserted that it
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of the International Court of Justice,27 or curtail them through
its control of the United Nations budget. 2 And third, ultimate
accountability lies in the respect accorded to the Council's deci-
sions: if the Council's powers were stretched beyond credulity,
States retain the power simply to ignore the expression of those
powers and refuse to comply.29
A third set of essays consider a specific example of efforts to
enforce law through United Nations auspices in the form of in-
ternational criminal prosecution. Daryl Mundis and James
Cockayne survey the range of institutional forms that such prose-
cutions have taken. A decade into the work of the ad hoc Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, as pressure on the Tribunals to wind up their business
builds, Mundis looks to the experience of the Nuremberg Trials
which completed their work in a mere four years.30 One harsh
reality of the international system is that the lessons that are
most thoroughly learned tend to be those which are expensive.
Whatever insights may be drawn from the Nuremberg process,
the lesson from the 1990s experience of war crimes trials that
has actually been internalized is that ad hoc tribunals on the scale
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are unlikely
to be repeated - primarily for reasons of cost.31 Given the
United States' ongoing allergic reaction to the International
Criminal Court, hybrid tribunals such as that which Cockayne
describes are sometimes proposed as a suitable compromise.
Such tribunals, operating in theater with limited resources and a
could meet to recommend collective measures in situations where the veto prevented
the Council from fulfilling its primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security). An untested corollary is that the Assembly could equally
assert that the Council has exceeded its authority.
27. See U.N. CHARTER art. 96(1).
28. See U.N. CHARTER art. 17(1).
29. See Certain Expenses Case, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 230 (Winiarski J., dissent-
ing); Advisory Opinion, Namibia, [1971] I.CJ. Rep. 16, 293 (FitzmauriceJ., dissenting),
Advisory Opinion, Namibia, [1971] I.CJ. Rep. at 340 (GrosJ., dissenting); Preliminary
Objections, Lockerbie Case, [1998] I.C.J. Rep. 9, 24-25, 40-45.
30. See Daryl A. Mundis, Completing the Mandates of the Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals: Lessons from the Nuremberg Process?, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 591 (2005).
31. See Margaret Sewell, Freedom From Fear: Prosecuting the Iraqi Regime for the Use of
Chemical Weapons, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 365, 386 (2004); see also Lori Sinanyan, The
International Criminal Court: Why the United States Should Sign the Statute (But Perhaps Wait
to Ratify), 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1180 (2000).
2005]
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defined lifespan, are in many ways asked to do more with less, as
Cockayne argues. The Special Court for Sierra Leone faces
special difficulties due to its mandate to focus on those bearing
the greatest responsibility for the trauma of that country's recent
history - made difficult by the fact that those presumed most
responsible are either dead or in Nigeria.33
These two articles are helpful checks on a literature that
tends to idealize international criminal processes or truth and
reconciliation commissions as the only appropriate coda to a
bloody history. The comparison with Nuremberg is instructive
in other ways, however. Even at the conclusion of World War II,
it was not clear that the Allies would pursue legal avenues to
punish the Nazi leadership. British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, for example, had favored the summary execution of
fifty or so leading members of the Nazi apparatus. 4 Stalin ap-
proved: in a "semi-jocular" recommendation he suggested that
50,000 German general staff officers be shot.3 5 This exchange
tends to be dismissed as an aberration, but the serious reasons
behind Churchill's proposal bear examination. It enjoyed the
virtues of simplicity and candor. It would avoid a time-consum-
ing and potentially embarrassing process of presenting a water-
tight case against the accused. And, crucially, the victors would
not be required to pretend that a punishment imposed by one
sovereign upon another required appeal to the neutral instru-
ment of the law.3 6 The decision to push for trials was largely
driven by the United States: Henry Stimson, the U.S. Secretary
for War, argued that a duly constituted international tribunal
32. See James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribu-
nals, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 616 (2005).
33. See Aryeh Neier, Accountability for State Crimes: The Past Twenty Years and the Next
Twenty Years, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 351, 351 (2003); see also Human Rights First,
International Justice, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, at http://www.humanright-
sfirst.org/international justice/w_context/w~cont_04.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
34. SeeJustice Richard Goldstone, The Trial of Saddam Hussein: What Kind of Court
Should Prosecute Saddam Hussein and Others for Human Rights Abuses?, 27 FoRDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1490, 1492 (2003).
35. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR 30 (1992).
36. See Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness: Screening Nazi Concentration Camps before
the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE L.J. 449, 457 (1995). In the case of the Israeli prosecu-
tion of Adolf Eichmann, the difficulties in extraditing him from Argentina led to "fre-
quent" mention of the alternative of "kill[ing] him there and then, in the streets of
Buenos Aires." HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY
OF EVIL 265 (1963).
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would better serve history than a repeat of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, which had enabled Germans to claim that admissions of
war guilt had been exacted under duress.3" U.S. President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt wavered, but his successor, Harry S.
Truman, had utter contempt for the idea of summary execu-
tions. In the event, the final decision to cede "Power... to Rea-
son," as U.S. Chief of Counsel Justice Robert H. Jackson later
termed it,"8 was formalized on a particularly inauspicious date.
In one of history's more brutal ironies, the treaty that estab-
lished the Nuremberg trials was signed by the Allies the day
before the United States dropped its second atomic bomb on
Japan.39
The tension between power and law is most strained in the
subject matter of the fourth subject considered in this collection:
What laws should limit the actions by a Great Power seeking to
defend itself against a potential catastrophic attack by an unseen
enemy? Much has been written on the U.S. response to terror-
ism and actions taken in the name of preventing it. This encom-
passes accounts of the stretching of rules on the use of force, the
impact on the laws of war including revitalization of the law of
military occupation and the creation of new categories of detain-
ees, the reconsideration of torture as a legitimate tool in a "war
on terror," and new constraints on civil liberties within the
United States itself.4" To this burgeoning literature, Lieutenant
Colonel Paul E. Kantwill and Major Sean Watts add an important
perspective from the ranks of those tasked with managing the
tension between power and law on a daily basis: the Judge Advo-
cates of the U.S. military. Kantwill and Watts examine the legal
and political background to the U.S. decision to limit applica-
37. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBALJUSTICE 212-13 (1999).
38. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 99 (1949).
39. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, signed Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; see also 1945:
Atom Bomb Hits Nagasaki, BBC ON THIS DAY (U.K.), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthis-
day/hi/dates/stories/august/9/newsid -3580000/3580143.stm (last visited Apr. 22,
2005) (noting that the second atomic bomb hit Nagasaki on August 9, 1945).
40. See, e.g., Alexandra V. Orlova & James W. Moore, "Umbrellas" or "Building
Blocks"?: Defining International Terrorism and Translational Organized Crime in International
Law, 27 Hous. J. INT'L L. 267 (2005); David L. Sloss, Availability of U.S. Court to Detainee
at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base - Reach of Habeus Corpus - Executive Power in War in
Terror, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 788 (2004).
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tion of the Geneva Convention to the "Global War on Terror"
and the creation of a category of "unlawful combatants" (or ex-
tra-conventional persons); they juxtapose this with the institu-
tional question of how the Judge Advocate General's Corps has
responded to this and other challenges presented by the war on
terror.41
The assertion that those with moral right on their side enjoy
special legal rights has frequently extended beyond the law re-
garding the decision to use force (jus ad bellum) to embrace
those rules that govern how such coercive means are exercised
(jus in bello). Indeed, in 1952 a committee of the American Soci-
ety of International Law expressed doubts that international hu-
manitarian law was fully applicable to U.N. forces, concluding
that the United Nations should "select such of the laws of war as
may seem to fit its purposes. ' 4 2 Similar arguments were made
(unsuccessfully) at Nuremberg concerning the Allied forces. 43 It
has been assumed by most writers that even States involved in
U.N.-authorized enforcement actions remain bound by their in-
dividual obligations under the jus in bello.44 This would be true
for actions authorized by the U.N. Security Council, but it would
be less clear if the Council deployed forces made available to it
under Article 43 agreements - a hypothetical proposition since
no such agreements have been concluded.45 Remaining doubts
about the applicability of international humanitarian law to the
United Nations have been removed by the United Nations it-
self.46
41. See Paul E. Kantwill & Sean Watts, Hostile Protected Persons or "Extra-Conventional
Persons". How Unlawful Combatants in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordinary Challenges
for Military Attorneys and Commanders, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 681 (2005).
42. Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action, Report of
Committee on Study of Legal Problems of the United Nations, 46 AM. Soc'v INT'L L.
PRoc. 220 (1952).
43. See Bernard D. Meltzer, A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate, 14 U. CHI.
L. REv. 455, 461-62 (1947).
44. See DEREK W. BowErr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY OF UNITED
NATIONS PRACTICE 503-06 (1964).
45. See generally Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime,
7 DUKEJ. COMp. & INT'L L. 185 (1996);Julianne Peck, The UN and the Laws of War: How
Can the World's Peacekeepers Be Held Accountable?, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 283
(1995); Brian D. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanita-
rian Law to United Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 61 (1997).
46. See Secretary-General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), at http://www.un.org/
peace/st.sgb_1999_13.pdf; see also 1971 Zagreb Resolution of the Institute of Interna-
THE UNITED NATIONS AND LAW OF WAR
Agitation from within the military, a slow awakening by the
U.S. judiciary, and the need for international support in
counter-terrorist activities and the ongoing difficulties in Iraq
have led to a reassessment of some of the decisions made in the
early days of the war on terror. A cynic might attribute this to
Churchill's observation that the United States is a country that
can always be relied upon to do the right thing - once it has
exhausted the alternatives.47 An alternative view is that power
and law are always in tension and that the present historical mo-
ment is just a particularly testing period for those norms that
would constrain the capacity of the United States - a Great
Power whose military budget is half of all global defense spend-
ing - to determine when and how to use the coercive means at
its disposal.
Justice Holmes' observation about hard cases, quoted ear-
lier, seems especially apt here. But the context from which the
clich6 is typically lifted also bears examination. As Holmes ob-
served, the hard cases are frequently the great ones:
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shap-
ing the law of the future, but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feel-
ings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests
exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previ-
ously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well
settled principles of law will bend.4"
How the current historical period will be viewed, what ef-
fects the war on terror will have on norms that limit humanity's
proven capacity for destructiveness, and whether humanity's
most powerful collectivity will ever regard multilateralism as an
end rather than simply a means depends very much on the con-
sequences of the hydraulic pressure currently at work on the in-
ternational system.
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47. "The Americans will always do the right thing ... after they've exhausted all
the alternatives." Winston Churchill (1874-1965).
48. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Holmes, of course, was writing a dissent.
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